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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-1750 
___________ 
 
KEVIN C. BRATHWAITE, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN PERRY PHELPS; DEPUTY WARDEN DAVID PIERCE; DEPUTY 
WARDEN CHRISTOPHER KLEIN; JAMES SCARBOROUGH; MARCELLO 
RISPOLI; KAREN HAWKINS; LT. FURMAN; RONALD HOSTERMAN; LINDA 
KEMP; LARRY SAVAGE; DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; 
CLASSIFICATION PERSONNEL; DR. DEROSIERS; NURSE CAROL BIANNCHI 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-10-cv-00646) 
District Judge:  Honorable Gregory M. Sleet 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
January 8, 2015 
 
Before: FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR., and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: February 18, 2015) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PER CURIAM 
 Kevin Brathwaite, an inmate at the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center (“VCC”) 
in Smyrna, Delaware, filed a pro se civil rights action against correctional employees and 
medical personnel at VCC, bringing claims for due process violations, excessive force, 
and deliberate indifference to medical needs.  The parties have completed discovery and 
motions for summary judgment filed by the five remaining defendants are pending before 
the District Court.  Over the course of this litigation, Brathwaite has filed a variety of 
requests for injunctive relief, all of which have been denied by the District Court.  In his 
most recent motion for preliminary injunction, Brathwaite asserted that he has been 
wrongfully housed in the Security Housing Unit (“SHU”) for nearly ten years, without 
receiving any meaningful review of his security classification level.  Brathwaite alleged 
that, in or around October 2013, the inmate classification board recommended that he be 
transferred to the general housing population, but that Warden Pierce arbitrarily vetoed 
the security reclassification and kept Brathwaite in SHU.  He also alleged that, in 
retaliation for the 2013 re-publication of his 2010 book, “Big Boss: Somebody’s Gonna 
Pay,” a memoir exposing corruption in the Delaware Department of Corrections, various 
prison officials have filed false disciplinary charges against him and violated disciplinary 
procedures in order to manipulate his security classification level and keep him in SHU.     
 In December 2013, Brathwaite was written up on various disciplinary charges, and 
the resulting “points” affected his security classification status.  Brathwaite admitted to a 
number of the disciplinary infractions, such as the possession of football betting slips, but 
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disputed the validity of certain aspects of his disciplinary hearings and the prison appeals 
process.  He averred that actions by a number of prison employees have violated his 
rights to free speech and equal protection.  Brathwaite did not specify the injunctive relief 
that he seeks, but we presume that he seeks to be reclassified to a lower security level and 
transferred to the general population. 
 The District Court denied the motion.  Brathwaite filed a timely Notice of Appeal.  
Appellees have moved for summary affirmance of the District Court’s order, and 
Brathwaite has opposed their motion.  Brathwaite has also filed a motion in this court 
titled a “Motion to Amend More Evidence,” in which he seeks to introduce prisoner 
classification documents that were not part of the record before the District Court.  
Appellees have opposed this motion.   
 We have jurisdiction over appeals from interlocutory orders granting or refusing 
injunctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).  “We generally review a district court’s 
denial of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion but review the underlying 
factual findings for clear error and examine legal conclusions de novo.”  Brown v. City of 
Pittsburgh, 586 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2009).  Our standard of review is narrow.  Liberty 
Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 562 F.3d 553, 556 (3d Cir. 2009).  “Unless an 
abuse of discretion is clearly established, or an obvious error has [occurred] in the 
application of the law, or a serious and important mistake has been made in the 
consideration of the proof, the judgment of the trial court must be taken as presumptively 
correct.”  Premier Dental Prods. Co. v. Darby Dental Supply Co., 794 F.2d 850, 852 (3d 
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Cir. 1986) (quotation omitted).  We may affirm on any grounds supported by the record, 
see Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 122 n.1 (3d Cir. 2001), and we may summarily affirm 
if Brathwaite does not raise a substantial question on appeal.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d 
Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.    
 To obtain the “extraordinary remedy” of a preliminary injunction, the moving 
party must establish: “(1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that [he] will suffer 
irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that granting preliminary relief will not 
result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) that the public interest favors 
such relief.”  Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 2004).  
Furthermore, because of the “complex and intractable problems of prison 
administration,” a request for injunctive relief in the prison context calls for caution and 
judicial restraint.  Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995); see also 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3626(a)(2). 
 In denying the request for a preliminary injunction, the District Court held that 
Brathwaite had failed to demonstrate any likelihood of success on the merits of his 
retaliation claim because inmates do not have a statutory or constitutional entitlement to a 
particular custodial classification.  The District Court noted that it had dismissed similar 
claims as frivolous early in the litigation, upon its initial review of the complaint and 
amended complaints under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.  The District Court also held that 
Brathwaite’s retaliation claim was conclusory and unsupported by the record, and that he 
had failed to show irreparable harm.  We need not address these holdings, however, 
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because we conclude that Brathwaite’s motion is insufficiently related to his current 
action.1    
 In his motion for preliminary injunction, Brathwaite alleged retaliation and other 
constitutional violations by at least nine prison employees who are not defendants in this 
case.  Of these employees, only Warden Pierce and Captain Rispoli were named in any of 
Brathwaite’s initial complaints, and both were terminated as defendants in 2010.2  The 
only claims remaining before the District Court to this action are Brathwaite’s claims for 
excessive force and indifference to medical needs, based on events that occurred in 2008 
to 2010, against five defendants who were not named in the motion for preliminary 
injunction.  In December 2013, a few weeks before he filed his preliminary injunction 
motion, Brathwaite moved for leave to amend his 2010 complaint yet again, to add a 
retaliation claim based on recent events.  The District Court had not yet ruled on this 
motion when Brathwaite sought the injunctive relief at issue here, and there therefore was 
                                              
1 Although we need not address these holdings here, we note that the District Court may 
have overstated the case law when it concluded that an inmate’s placement or retention in 
segregated housing can never create a liberty interest implicating due process rights.  See, 
e.g., Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 2000).   
 
2 To the extent that Brathwaite in fact seeks to challenge the District Court’s December 8, 
2010 order terminating these defendants, we do not have jurisdiction because that order is 
not appealable at this time.  Similarly, to the extent that Brathwaite seeks to challenge the 
District Court’s December 8, 2010 ruling that his original claims regarding the security 
classification review process were frivolous, we may not review that order at this time.  
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no retaliation claim pending before the District Court when it denied his motion.3  
Because the preliminary injunction motion dealt with claims and actions by prison 
employees unrelated to the suit at that time, the District Court appropriately held that 
Brathwaite could not establish any right to injunctive relief.  See De Beers Consol. 
Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945); accord Kaimowitz v. Orlando, 
Fla., 122 F.3d 41, 43 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). 
 Accordingly, because this appeal presents no substantial question, we will 
summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 
10.6.  Appellant’s motion to amend is denied. 
                                              
3 The appropriate method by which to assert a new, unrelated retaliation claim against 
new defendants is by filing a separate civil action in the District Court.   
